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Mr. Justice Antonin Scalia: A Renaissance of Positivism
and Predictability in Constitutional Adjudication
Introduction
An advocate's chief obligation is to help his client avoid litigation
in resolving legal dilemmas.' At times, however, it is only through judicial
proceedings that the client's best interest can be served. In choosing to
pursue an action in the state or federal courts, an attorney must be
able to predict the probable outcome of his client's case based on the
applicable legislation and jurisprudence concerning the facts relevant to
the case. Further, he must be able to discern in issues of law the
interpretation which individual judges will likely give to those statutes
and cases. This factor is especially important if the case reaches the
Supreme Court of the United States. 2
A fundamental fault with much constitutional scholarship is the
assumption that the Court should act like an ordinary court.' Justice
Lewis Powell said in 1979 that:
It [the Supreme Court) is empowered to decide whether the other
two branches of government (and the states) live within the
Constitution .... That's a rather awesome power and it's one
that makes our system and our Court distinctive.4
Copyright 1991, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. See, e.g., W. Harbaugh, Lawyer's Lawyer: The Life of John W. Davis 45 (1990)
("Davis was keenly sensitive to the attorney's role as conciliator. As he once remarked after
resolving a domestic quarrel, the lawyer was obligated to prevent strife when possible, and
the man who appreciated the real height of the profession had as many opportunities to do
good as a clergyman. Unfortunately, many lawyers failed to fulfill the ideal.").
2. See W. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court; How It Was, How It Is 253 (1987) ("The
work of the Court consists essentially of three different functions: (1) choosing from among
more than 4,000 'petitions for certiorari' somewhere around 150 cases in which certiorari is
granted; (2) deciding these 150, which includes studying the briefs, hearing oral arguments
by the lawyers for the parties, and voting on them at conference; and (3) preparing written
opinions supporting the result reached by the majority and separate opinions and dissenting
opinions by those [J]ustices who do not agree with the reasoning of the majority.").
3. A. Miller, Toward Increased Judicial Activism: The Political Role of the Supreme
Court 39 (1982); See also Stewart, The Great Persuader, 76 A.B.A.J. 61 (Nov. 1990) ("Brennan
was fond of telling his law clerks that the first rule of the Supreme Court was that it takes
five votes to win.").
4. A. Miller, supra note 3, at 39.
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This article will concentrate on the present and future influence of
Justice Antonin Scalia on constitutional adjudication in the Supreme
Court.5 Justice Scalia was appointed by President Ronald Reagan on
September 26, 1986, filling Justice Rehnquist's vacated Eighth Chair on
the Court. 6 He has brought to the Court an energetic and courageous
brand of positivism that the Court has not evinced in its opinions since
the departure of Justice Hugo Black.7 This vitality has blunted scholarly
criticisms of his stewardship of the Constitution.' In fact, recently, Justice
Scalia has been identified as an "emblematic rather than an enigmatic
figure." 9
This article will discuss the political presence and future of Justice
Scalia on the Court and the practical implications that flow from that
presence; pinpoint his judicial methodology upon the spectrum of tra-
ditional legal philosophies of law; illustrate the link between his theory
of law and modern American positivism; and trace, through his Supreme
Court opinions, the positivism and use of history which Justice Scalia
uses in his decision-making process. Furthermore, this writer will argue
that the personification of the antithesis of Justice Scalia's judicial meth-
odology on the Court is Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. Justice O'Connor,
although politically a conservative in many areas of the law, utilizes a
balancing of interests analysis based on a cost-benefit utilitarianism 0
5. Recently appointed as Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
6. Among the existing Chairs on the Supreme Court, the Eighth Chair maintains the
most exclusive list consisting of only eight Justices; two of whom were later appointed Chief
Justice.
7. Justice Black served on the Supreme Court from 1937 until retiring in 1971.
8. But see Yoder, Trying to Figure Out Scalia, Wash. Post, Aug. 1, 1989, at A21,
col. 6; Gelfand & Werhan, Federalism and Separation of Powers on a "Conservative" Court:
Currents and Cross-Currents From Justices O'Connor and Scalia, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 1443,
1462-63 n.8 (1990) ("Though beyond the scope of this Essay, the tensions, apparent incon-
sistencies, and rationalization of Scalia's theories of constitutional and statutory interpretation
are worthy of careful scholarly examination.").
9. Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 Yale L.J. 1297, 1299
(1990).
10. Later, this article will more greatly detail Justice O'Connor's location on the spectrum
of judicial methodology based on the premise that it is evolved from the teachings of Roscoe
Pound.
Introduced to the United States through the writings of Roscoe Pound, the german jurist
Rudolph von Jhering (1818-1892) is considered a founding architect of the school of legal
utilitarianism.
The central notion in Jhering's philosophy of law was the concept of purpose. In the
preface to his chief jurisprudential work, he pointed out that "the fundamental idea of the
present work consists in the thought that Purpose is the creator of the entire law; that there
is no legal rule which does not owe its origin to a purpose, i.e. to a practical motive." R.
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or a pragmatic approach. 1 This article will foil this philosophy against
that of Justice Scalia in order to provide the reader with a better under-
standing of Justice Scalia's judicial philosophy.
The Next Chief Justice
It appears that the people of our country are currently content with
a federal government run by a Democratic Congress and a Republican
executive. Unless the Democratic party can construct a more broadly based
coalition in its pursuit for the presidency, it will continue to visit the
White House instead of residing there.' 2 Consequently, the Republican
Party has held exclusive de facto control over the Supreme Court nom-
ination process since 1969.' 3 During that time, Republican presidents have
seated eight Justices onto the Supreme Court. 14
Chief Justice Rehnquist has now served on the Court for eighteen
Jhering, Law as a Means to an End liv (transl. I. Husik) (1924).
Law, he declared, was consciously set by the human will to achieve certain desired results.
He admitted that the institution had part of its roots in history; but he rejected the contention
of the historical jurists that law was nothing but the product of unintended, unconscious,
purely historical forces. R. Jhering, The Struggle for Law 6-11 (transl. J. Lalor 8-9) (1879).
The end or purpose of legal regulation was indicated by Jhering in his often-quoted
definition of law: "Law is the sum of the conditions of social life in the widest sense of
the term, as secured by the power of the State through, the means of external compulsion."
R. Jhering, Law as a Means to an End, supra, at 380. See also E. Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence;
The Philosophy and Method of the Law 86-87 (2d ed. 1962).
11. For a working definition of judicial pragmatism, see J. Cueto-Rua, Judicial Methods
of Interpretation of the Law 191 (1981):
The mere fact that the application of the rule, as traditionally understood and
applied, may cause unexpected and extended hardship is an indication that logical
treatment may be insufficient or that logical development has gone too far.
A line needs to be drawn. The point at which hardship and general inconvenience
begins may be a good place to draw that line by introducing pragmatic criteria
for the narrower definition of the area where the precedent, as traditionally in-
terpreted, ought to operate.
If the consequences to be brought about by the traditional interpretation of the
rule are negative or if no social interests appear to be satisfied by logical adherence
to past meanings, the time may be ripe for a re-definition of the rule.
12. See, e.g., R. Kuttner, The Life of the Party; Democratic Prospects in 1988 and
Beyond (1987).
13. During President Carter's term from 1977-1981, there was no opportunity to nominate
a Justice to the Supreme Court.
14. Historically, previous single-party control of the nomination process had the following
de facto results: (1) Washington and the Federalists (1789-1801) 14 seats; (2) Republicans




years. Statistics show that only eleven Justices have served thirty years or
more." Thus, his tenure on the Court should realistically expire within
the next decade unless he breaks all longevity records.' 6 His appointment
as Chief Justice in 1986 was extraordinary in that only three previous
Associate Justices were later successfully appointed Chief.' 7
Conservative Court watchers have been exuberant in following Chief
Justice Rehnquist's Court in action. The lesson to be learned from the
"Rehnquist success" for conservatives is that to ensure anticipated results,
an incumbent Justice should be nominated for the Chief's seat.'8 The
prospect of returning to an "activist" Warren or Burger Court is uncon-
scionable to contemporary conservatives. The politically astute are aware
that both of these men were appointed as Chief Justice from outside the
Court by Republican administrations hoping to inject restraint into the
Court's adjudication. Because those hopes were dashed, and because a
repetition of that scenario is sought to be avoided by today's conservative
policymakers, this author believes that the next Chief Justice will be either
Antonin Scalia or Sandra Day O'Connor.
Justice Scalia's academic and practical experiences prior to his service
on the Court have been well documented by legal scholars. 9 Untouched
by contemporary students of the Court, however, is mention of the his-
torical significance of Justice Scalia's presence on the Court. He was only
the seventh Catholic,10 the fourteenth with continental European lineage, 21
and the first Italian-American on the Court. At the age of fifty when
appointed, he was slightly below the median age of appointment for the
Court," and was the fourteenth Justice seated from the state of New
York.23
Justice O'Connor entered service on the Supreme Court on September
15. See A. Blaustein & R. Mersky, The First Hundred Justices 28-29 (1978).
16. The record for longevity on the Court is held by William 0. Douglas who served
from 1939-1975, a period of thirty-six years, six months and twenty-six days. Id. at 28.
Douglas was 40 years old when he joined the Court while Rehnquist was 47 years old.
17. Id. at 126. This list includes Edward Douglass White (1910), Charles Evans Hughes
(1930) & Harlan Fiske Stone (1941). Both John Rutledge and Abe Fortas failed to be
confirmed as Chief after serving as Associate Justices.
18. This author subscribes to the opinion that the failure in nominating Abe Fortas to
the position of Chief Justice was in large part a question of ethics. See also id. at 47.
19. See, e.g., Gelfand & Werhan, supra note 8; Yoder, supra note 8; Kannar, supra
note 9.
20. Justice Anthony Kennedy became the eighth Catholic upon his being seated. The
only time the Court had three Catholics serving simultaneously came to an end this summer
when Justice Brennan retired.
21. A. Blaustein & R. Mersky, supra note 15, at 60-61.
22. Id. at 26.




25, 1981.2 The political significance of her gender cannot be understated.
This factor alone places her high among potential nominees in filling a
vacated seat as Chief Justice.
Further, both of these Justices are young and conservative with strong
views on matters of judicial restraint and federal jurisdiction 5 which seem
to be amiable to the present United States Senate which must, of course,
confirm any new appointment to the Court.? These political advantages
are compounded by the fact that every other sitting Justice either has not
developed a reliable paper trail as yet or is too old for appointment as
Chief Justice. 27
This discussion is important because the Chief Justice has the authority
to assign the drafting of opinions when he is in the majority in cases
before the Court. This authority is jealously guarded, and has been fre-
quently utilized when a Chief Justice wishes the Court to present a unan-
imous front to the public, 2s or when he wishes to limit the expansiveness
of a particular holding of the Court 9
The differences in methodology between the Justices Scalia and O'Con-
nor will be explored in order to determine how their philosophies will
impact the Court's adjudication if either of them were to obtain the "First
Chair."
Justice Scalia on the Jurisprudential Spectrum
The modem spectrum of jurisprudence includes legal schools of an-
alytical positivism, history, natural law, and pragmatism. Although sparring
24. For a detailed look at Justice O'Connor's background, see Savage, Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, in Eight Men and A Lady: Profiles of the Justices of the Supreme Court
(1990).
25. See, e.g., O'Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 Case Wes. Res. 1 (1984); O'Connor,
Reflections on the Preclusion of Judicial Review in England and the United States, 27 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 643 (1986); Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 3 Duke L.J. 511 (June 1989); Scalia, The Role of the Judiciary in Deregulation, 55
Antitrust 191 (1986); Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 19
(1982); Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989) (Scalia, J.); Thompson v. Thompson,
484 U.S. 174, 108 S. Ct. 513 (1988) (Scalia, J. & O'Connor, J., concurring).
26. An in-depth look at the hearings to confirm Justice Souter as a member of the
Court is illustrative of this fact. Also, in the aftermath of the Souter hearings, it should be
easier to elevate one of the current Justices to the Chief Justice's seat as his or her professional
competence to preside on the Court won't be an issue. This was important in the Souter
hearings as the Senate staked out the political position that it would not have litmus tests,
and only sought to determine competency.
27. The oldest Associate Justice to be elevated to Chief Justice was Harlan Fiske Stone
who was sixty-eight. A. Blaustein, supra note 15, at 27.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974); Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980); B. Woodward
& S. Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court (1979).
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occurs among Justices on the Supreme Court in the pages of written
opinions" and during oral arguments, the differences between Justices
Scalia and O'Connor arise from their conflicting judicial philosophies which
lie at opposite ends of the spectrum.3
I.
Pragmatism in the modern American legal philosophy evolved from
Roscoe Pound's sociological jurisprudence.3 2 Pound based his ideology of
law on the "satisfying of wants" of individual interests, public interests,
and social interests.3 He stated that:
[I]ndividual interests are claims or demands or desires involved
immediately in the individual life and asserted in title of that life.
Public interests are claims or demands or desires involved in life
in a politically organized society and asserted in title of that
organization .... Social interests are claims or demands or desires
involved in social life in civilized society and asserted in title of
that life.3'
Pound believed that there were also other interest groups, and that these
groups would overlap at times in attempts to achieve their wants. In fact,
according to Pound, law is "made up of adjustments or compromises of
conflicting individual interests in which we turn to some social interest,
frequently under the name of public policy, to determine the limits of a
30. See, e.g., Justice Scalia's treatment of Justice Brennan's concurrence in Burnham v.
Superior Court of California, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
31. The Modem Court has been beset by personal quarreling among its members, yet,
the "rift" on the pages of the reports between Scalia and O'Connor does not even begin
to approach the war Justice Robert Jackson had with Justice Hugo Black. See R. Conot,
Justice at Nuremberg 442 (1983).
32. "American jurisprudence will ever be indebted to Roscoe Pound. In the service of
quickening our legal institutions and making the law effective for the task of wise "social
engineering," he has combined profound insight, vast legal erudition, thorough acquaintance
with the work of early and contemporary legal philosophers in England and the Continent
[see supra note 10], and a wide knowledge of the social sciences." J. Frank, Law and the
Modem Mind 207 (1935).
"Roscoe Pound (1870-1964) was modem America's foremost legal scholar. His sociological
jurisprudence blended legal concepts with pragmatism and social science into a new synthesis
that replaced the sterile conception of law as a closed system of timeless doctrine.
He was office-trained and school-trained; he was a trial lawyer in the rugged courthouse
world of pioneer Nebraska and a master of the appellate brief; he was a judge, a teacher,
a dean, an advisor to government, and a scholar whose name became a synonym for legal
wisdom." D. Wigdor, Roscoe Pound; Philosopher of Law ix (1974).
33. Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1943).
34. Id. at 1-2.
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reasonable adjustment."35 The reverse in the balance, a striving for legal
order in society, was explained by Pound as "stating a paramount social
interest in the general security in terms of individual liberty."'3 6 Pound
even went so far as to say that "[flrom time to time more or less reversion
to justice without law becomes necessary in order to bring the adminis-
tration of justice into touch with new moral ideas or changed social or
political conditions. 37 This concept was echoed through the legal careers
of Supreme Court Justice William Brennan and Louisiana Supreme Court
Justice Albert Tate.38
This philosophy of the judge as the arbiter of competing societal
interests in deciding the proper holding of a case corresponds with Justice
O'Connor's methodology as well. In fact, Justice O'Connor has contin-
uously used societal balancing in her analyses in all areas of constitutional
law? 9 Although the pragmatic source of analysis is shared by Justices
Brennan and O'Connor, Justice Brennan aggressively supported the in-
dividual side of the equation when balanced against societal0 or public
interests4' while Justice O'Connor has consistently chosen not to place any
coins on the scale before hearing all claims. Also, consequent to her
position of judicial restraint, she would not be prone to accept the more
"activist Poundian" strain of analysis which Brennan and Tate both
advocated. Justice O'Connor stated, even before she was on the bench,
that "[i]t is not the duty of the Court to react to the social climate and
enact change." '4' Therefore, her pragmatism may not be as progressive as
35. Id. at 4.
36. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
37. Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 Colum. L. Rev. 696, 699 (1913).
38. See, e.g., Barham, A Civilian For Our Times: Justice Albert Tate, Jr., 47 La. L.
Rev. 929 (1987); Friedelbaum, Justice Brennan and the Burger Court: Policy-Making in the
Judicial Thicket, 19 Seton Hall L. Rev. 188 (1989).
39. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 107 S. Ct. 2793 (1987) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); Garcia v. San Antonia Met. Tran. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 105 S. Ct. 1005
(1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But see Note, Sandra Day O'Connor, Abortion, and
Compromise for the Court, 5 Touro L. Rev. 327, 339-42 (1989). In part of this article, the
author states that Justice O'Connor seeks bright lines in some areas of the law. However,
other than Justice O'Connor's respect for the Miranda rule in her dissent in New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984), the writer only urges that she is upset with
the current standards of review for equal protection claims.
40. Some writers have, of course, gone much further in their aversion to the work of
the Modern Court and its activism in the protection of civil liberties. See, e.g., W. Eaton,
Who Killed the Constitution 5 (1988) ("This most recent era differs from prior eras of
unauthorized judicial action in that, instead of merely vetoing legislation of Congress or the
States, the Court has invented a whole legislative program of its own, and imposed that
program upon the country.").
41. See The Nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor of Arizona to Serve as an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1981).
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Pound would have liked, but her flexibility in balancing societal interests
has placed her squarely within his school of reasoning. 42
II.
The second modern school of legal thought is natural law. 43 The
American form of government had its structural foundation in the writings
of natural law scholars such as John Locke and Baron Charles Louis de
Montesquieu. Both of these philosophers emphasized "liberty" above "or-
der" in their legal theories. Locke stated in his work, Of Civil Government,
that "the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators
as well as others.""
Natural law was advocated by members of our early Court such as
James Wilson,4' Samuel Chase,46 and Joseph Story.4 7 However, as the
nineteenth century progressed, concepts of natural law gave way to legal
theories supporting order in our society. It would not be until after World
War II that there would be a popular revival of natural law theories.4
42. The balancing of Justice O'Connor more closely resembles the vision sought by
Pound as he "did not develop sociological jurisprudence as a foundation for far-reaching
social departures." D. Wigdor, supra note 32, at 284.43. There are several different modem subdivisions of natural law such as Neo-Kantian,
Neo-Scholastic, Duguit's Legal Philosophy, the Policy-Science of Lasswell and McDougal,
and others which this article will not be able to discuss in depth. See E. Bodenheimer, supra
note 10.
44. Id. at 46.
45. Associate Justice on the Supreme Court 1789-1798. See J. Wilson, Works 49 (1896)
("Order, proportion, and fitness pervade the universe. Around us we see; within us we feel;
above us, we admire a rule from which deviation cannot, or should not, or will not be
made. Human law, must depend for its ultimate sanction on this immutable law of nature.").
See also E. Bodenheimer, supra note 10, at 50-51.
46. Associate Justice on the Supreme Court 1796-1811. See Justice Chase's argument
for the Court on natural law in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). His argument
comes straight from Locke's writings on the social compact between man and government.
47. Associate Justice on the Supreme Court 1811-1845. See Story, Essay on Natural
Law, 34 Or. L. Rev. 88 (1955) (reprint).
48. This reemergence of natural law primarily was caused by the reaction to the Nazi's
use of positivism to explain their legal responsibilities to the state in carrying out the law.
If the theoretical basis for this positivism was "fanatical," there would not have been the
reaction that ensued.
The Nazi view of the law was not some aberration from the lunatic fringe. It evoked a
sympathetic response from a considerable number of academic lawyers and members of the
legal profession. The most authoritative of the academic lawyers in Nazi Germany ... was
Ernst Rudolf Huber, Professor of Jurisprudence at Kiel. Huber expressed the following views
on the law:
The law is nothing other than the expression of the communal order in which
the people live and which derives from the Fuhrer. The Fuhrer Law makes concrete
the unwritten principles of the [people's] communal life. It is therefore impossible
to measure the laws of the Fuhrer against a higher concept of the law because
[Vol. 51
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In fact, some philosophers completely reversed their understanding of what
law is due to the excesses of the Nazi period.
A chief example of this conversion is german philosopher Gustav
Radbruch.4 9 Prior to the war, Radbruch believed that justice had as its
foundation the idea of legal certainty, which demands the promulgation
and maintenance of a positive and binding legal order of the state.A'° After
the war, he argued that legal positivism had left Germany defenseless
against the abuses of the Nazi regime and that it was necessary to recognize
situations where a totally unjust positive law must give way to justice.5
The Supreme Court has, in substance, throughout its history, attempted
to preserve Justice Chase's position that the judiciary's role is to ensure
that the government did not violate the rights of the people arising from
the natural law.12 The greatest illustration of this occurring on the modem
Court was Justice John Marshall Harlan's concurrence in Griswold v.
Connecticut."
This writer believes that, on the spectrum of legal philosophy, Justice
Scalia's methods are closer to natural law than to pragmatism. Pragmatists
do not inherently seek legal certainty at all, but approach the law in a
case-by-case manner, seeking to balance conflicting societal interests. Ad-
herents of natural law seek legal certainty, yet do not confine or restrain
their analyses to structured rules emanating from a legislature or sovereign.
The fundamental difference between natural law and positivism, therefore,
is that the objective of natural law is to espouse what law ought to be,
whereas positivism declares what law is.
every Fuhrer law is a direct expression of this [people's] concept of the law.
J. Noakes & G. Pridham, Nazism; A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, 1919-
1945 475-476 (1983).
The postwar trials of German public officials continued after the surviving top Nazi
leaders were prosecuted in 1946. However, due to the political pressure of the Cold War,
these tribunals ended by 1949. In fact, by 1951, only a few of the convicted were still
incarcerated. One of the judges in the I.G. Farben case during this time was L.S.U. Law
School Dean Paul Hebert. He became so incensed by the leniency of the sentence given by
his two fellow judges that "he issued a withering blast accusing them of bias in favor of
the accused." R. Conot, supra note 31, at 517.
49. Gustav Radbruch (1878-1949) was a German legal philosopher who started out from
a neo-Kantian philosophy of values and ended his life as a convert to natural law in a
moderate form.
50. E. Bodenheimer, supra note 10, at 132.
51. Id. at 133-34.
52. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 332 (3d ed. 1986).
53. 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Interestingly enough,
during Justice Souter's confirmation hearings, he stated that his position on a right to privacy
conformed to Justice Harlan's in Griswold. Hearing on the Confirmation of Judge David
Souter Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990).
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III.
Legal positivism arose in the nineteenth century as the legal community
incorporated the ideas of the scientific method into adjudication. 4 The
legal positivist holds that only positive law, those juridical norms which
have been established by the authority of the state, is law.15 The legal
positivist also insists on a strict separation of positive law from ethics and
social policy, and tends to identify justice with legality, that is, with
observance of the rules laid down by the state.5 6
Justice Hugo Black towers above all other modem American positivists
because he was able to exercise that philosophy in fact on the Court. His
positivism was central to his decision-making process throughout his ca-
reer.
5 7
Justice Scalia has also acknowledged in his extrajudicial writings that
he is a positivist.58 He has stated that the common law discretion-conferring
approach is ill-suited to a legal system in which the Supreme Court can
review only an insignificant proportion of the decided cases.5 9 Justice Scalia
avers that this approach is inappropriate for the Supreme Court because:
[t]he fact is that when we decide a case on the basis of what we
have come to call the "totality of the circumstances" test, it is
not we who will be "closing in on the law" in the foreseeable
future, but rather thirteen different courts of appeals-or, if it is
a federal issue that can arise in state court litigation as well,
thirteen different courts of appeals and fifty state supreme courts.A°
This type of system will suffer from a complete lack of uniformity, and
the failure to promulgate uniformity will result in the inability to predict
the consequences of legal action. "Predictability, or as Lilewellyn put it,
'reckonability,' is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name.
There are times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all." 61
54. "A careful observation of empirical facts and sense data was one of the principal
methods used in the natural sciences. It was hoped that in the social sciences this same
method would prove to be highly fruitful and valuable." E. Bodenheimer, supra note 10,
at 91.
55. See, e.g., Parker, Legal Positivism, 32 Notre Dame L. Rev. 31 (1956).
56. E. Bodenheimer, supra note 10, at 93.
57. See T. Yarbrough, Mr. Justice Black and His Critics (1988); But also see C. Williams,
Hugo L. Black: A Study in the Judicial Process (1950); Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the
Living Constitution, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 673 (1983); J. Frank, Mr. Justice Black: The Man
and His Opinions (1949).
58. See, e.g., Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989).
59. Id. at 1178.




The positivist, in attempting to discover the scope and meaning of
statutes and precedents, will look to the history surrounding a particular
ruling or enactment when merely reading its text would be insufficient in
formulating a holding.
IV.
The final modern school of legal thought is history.6 2 Students of the
historical school view law not as a product of an arbitrary and deliberate
will but of a slow, gradual, and organic growth.6 3 The concept of legal
historical jurisprudence sounds foreign to most practitioners and judges as
well. Its roots are German and theoretically is a reaction against the ideas
upon which our modern society was founded.6 Religious devotion to this
school of thought involves a dislike of legislation and an emphasis upon
silent, anonymous, and unconscious forces as true elements of legal growth
in which no legislator should be allowed to interfere.
In theory this frequency on the spectrum of law is remote from
positivism, as positivism bases law on the authority of the state through
legislation and precedent. However, in practice, history often works in
conjunction with positivism under theories such as "originalism." This
may confuse those attempting to understand a positivist's use of history.67
Positivists akin to Justice Scalia will look to history to help in ascertaining
the meaning given to legislation. Specifically, Justice Scalia feels that
"[o]riginalism does not aggravate the principal weakness of the system [of
judicial review],6 for it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually
quite separate from the preferences of the judge himself.'' The sphere
62. The founder and chief exponent of the English historical school of law was Sir
Henry Maine (1822-1888). His studies led him to the conviction that the legal history of
peoples shows patterns of evolution which recur in different social orders and in similar
historical circumstances. E. Bodenheimer, supra note 10, at 74.
63. Id. at 72.
64. The classical law of nature, as an essentially revolutionary doctrine, looked to
the future. The historical school, as a reaction to it, looked to the past. In evaluating
the historical school of law it should not be forgotten that Savigny was a conservative
nobleman who detested the equalitarian rationalism of the French Revolution.
Id. at 73.
65. Id. at 73.
66. See Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).
67. See, e.g., Professor Laurence Tribe's frustration in figuring how Justice Scalia can
justifiably rule the way he does in, L. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes 100 (1990)
("In almost every case, of course, no matter what axis we examine, Justice Scalia's test will
mandate a conclusion that there is no tradition protecting the asserted right.").
68. The principal defect being that "judges will mistake their own predilections for the
law." Scalia, supra note 66, at 863.
69. Id. at 864.
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of positivism relies inherently on history, 70 yet, the positivistic notion of
using history as a tool instead of as an oracle has been utilized frequently
by the Supreme Court since 1900.71
V.
Justice Scalia's legal philosophy can, therefore, be placed in the school
of positivism, far from the school of pragmatism from which Justice
O'Connor draws her reasoning. His decisions are based on strict inter-
pretations of statutes, constitutional provisions, and precedents. Ambiguities
are deciphered by utilization of history, though any devices which aid him
in creating legal certainty may be employed. 72
Modern American Positivism
Such eminent legal scholars as Pound, Justice Benjamin Cardozo,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Jerome Frank harshly criticized pos-
itivism. They considered it overly mechanical, and cited its failure to utilize
non-formal elements of law in its analysis, thus limiting its effectiveness
in adapting to the needs of a modern society.73 These learned men chose
different paths of legal reasoning in their assaults on positivism; however,
they all would agree that:
[t]he attempt to emancipate the law from the social and economic
70. In fact, "genuine interpretation of law is the discovery of the intention with which
[the sovereign] constructed the statute, or of the sense which he attached to the words wherein
the statute is expressed." J. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence 1023 (4th ed. 1873).
71. See J. Daly, The Use of History in the Decisions of the Supreme Court: 1900-1930
(1954). In particular, Mr. Daly emphasizes the especially strong reliance on history by Chief
Justice Edward D. White. "It seems safe to say that Chief Justice White was the leading
historian on his own Court. The cases here presented display again his ability to read history,
and to deduce therefrom all the significant data and interpretations for application to the
problem at hand." Id. at 152.
See also Baier, Edward Douglass White: Frame For a Portrait, 43 La. L. Rev. 1001
(1983). This oration celebrated the achievements of Louisiana's only representative on the
Supreme Court who rose from Associate Justice to Chief Justice during his tenure. See also
New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349, 41 S. Ct. 506, 507 (1921) (Justice Holmes'
famous quote that "A page of history is worth a volume of logic.").
72. See Scalia, supra note 66, at 864, where Justice Scalia claims to be a "fainthearted
originalist." Based on this claim, this author believes that Justice Scalia will also rely on
other legal bases which foster legal certainty such as natural law. This conclusion is also
supported by Justice Scalia's own hypothetical on flogging in the article cited above and his
answer to it concerning "evolutionary content." Id.
73. See, e.g., Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 641 (1923).
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forces that are instrumental in shaping its institutions can at best
have a partial success. In the long run, logic is apt to lead to
life, and technicality to justice and social need. 74
Thus, the greatest legal minds in America, even before the coming of the
Second World War, were gouging at the core of the legitimacy of posi-
tivism. These criticisms bore fruit amongst students of their time, and the
reaction to positivism's manipulation by dictatorial governments sounded
its death knell to many in our judicial system. 71
Enter Justice Hugo Black. Justice Black was a great many things to
a great many people. No person who sits on the Supreme Court for over
thirty years can realistically have every one of his opinions pigeonholed
under a particular philosophy of law. However, after his dissent in Adam-
son v. California in 1947,76 Justice Black attempted to remain consistent
in his constitutional determinations by utilizing positivism in a form he
himself described as "absolutism." In Adamson, he "made it clear that
the Bill of Rights sets limits as well as horizons for him, while others on
the Court were unwilling to make this commitment and chose to regard
the Bill of Rights as furnishing a minimal, not a preemptive, content to
the fourteenth amendment." 77 Also, in a speech delivered at the New York
School of Law in 1960, Black lashed out at those who would balance
freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights by stating: "I cannot accept
this approach to the Bill of Rights. It is my belief that there are 'absolutes'
in our Bill of Rights, and they were put there on purpose by men who
knew what words meant, and meant their prohibitions to be 'absolutes.'9 7 8
Justice Black's governing canon of constitutional interpretation is to
search for the natural meaning of the text of the Constitution in contrast
to relying on natural law.79 When this meaning was ambiguous, his analysis
involved a healthy reliance on history as a tool.8°
Justice Black took a position as a defender of these "absolute" rights
which compelled judicial action where the Constitution required it, thereby
74. E. Bodenheimer, supra note 10, at 174.
75. See Northrup, Contemporary Jurisprudence and International Law, 61 Yale L.J. 623
(1952).
76. 332 U.S. 46, 67 S. Ct. 1672 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
77. P. Freund, On Law and Justice 217 (1968).
78. Dillard, The Individual and the Bill of Absolute Rights, Hugo Black and the Supreme
Court: A Symposium 100 (1967).
79. P. Freund, supra note 77, at 215.
80. But see A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 73, 98-110 (2d ed. 1986) (Mr. Bickel
recognizes Justice Black's positivism and makes a scholarly attack against all the weaknesses
of such a philosophy. Here, he claims Justice Black's reliance on history is unsuitable especially
in areas such as the Fourteenth Amendment.).
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inviting a renaissance of substantive judging."1 The greatest examples of
his "activism" in protecting these rights occurred in first amendment cases.
He placed the protection of free speech in a preferred position by
dissenting in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies.83 He
stated:
And in reaching my conclusion I view the guaranties of the First
Amendment as the foundation upon which our governmental struc-
ture rests and without which it could not continue to endure as
conceived and planned .... In fact, this privilege is the heart of
our government. If that heart be weakened, the result is debili-
tation; if it be stilled, the result is death.4
Thirty years later, in New York Times Co. v. United States,"3 his last
quotation from the bench was "[t]he greater the importance of safeguarding
the community from incitement to the overthrow of our institutions ...
the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional
rights of free speech, free press and free assembly.'"' For him, these
freedoms also shielded types of speech that the majority of the Court
considered unprotected, such as obscenity 7 and libel. 81
In spite of this espoused absolute right of freedom of speech, Justice
Black did not join the majority of the Court in extending Constitutional
protection to various forms of expressive behavior which he distinguished
as conduct 9
A period of pragmatic dominance on the Supreme Court followed the
exodus of Justice Black in 1971 during which positivism in constitutional
adjudication lay dormant as a methodology until Justice Scalia revived its
use. However, this rebirth of positivism has not as yet resulted in a
duplication of Justice Black's holdings in first amendment expressive com-
munication cases. A fundamental distinction is that where Justice Black
81. G. White, The American Judicial Tradition 336 (1976).
82. Dillard, supra note 78, at 110.
83. 312 U.S. 287, 61 S. Ct. 552 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 301-02, 61 S. Ct. at 558-59.
85. 403 U.S. 713, 91 S. Ct. 2140 (1971).
86. Id. at 720, 91 S. Ct. at 2144.
87. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 86 S. Ct. 942 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
88. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S. Ct. 725 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
89. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S. Ct. 1780 (1971) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (this was the "F. the Draft" case where Justice Harlan held for the Court
that the writing on the jacket was protected communication); Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576, 89 S. Ct. 1354 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (Justice Black disagreed with the Court's
decision written by Justice Harlan stating that the First Amendment does not protect the
statutorily proscribed conduct of burning the flag).
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could separate conduct from speech, Justice Scalia has voted with the
majority of the present Court in declaring expressive communication pro-
tected under the first amendment. 9° We get a glimpse of his reasoning in
a quotation taken from the oral arguments of United States v. Eichman
where he states that "lpleople who burn flags clearly have a message ...
they're saying [w]e hate the United States." 91 In order to better understand
Justice Scalia's personal manner of positivism and its relationship with the
past, an examination of some of his recent opinions on Constitutional
issues confronting the Court in its last term is appropriate.
Justice Scalia's Appeal For Legal Certainty
The following review of recent Supreme Court decisions will attempt
to illustrate the results of the conflicting methodologies of Justices Scalia
and O'Connor. Justice Scalia's use of positivism and history in attempting
to establish legal certainty will be contrasted with Justice O'Connor's
approach to law which is to balance the interests of the conflicting societal
elements in each case. To this end, cases centering on the issues of the
right to die, abortion, diversity jurisdiction, the right of confrontation,
obscenity, and the definition of cruel and unusual punishment will be
examined in turn.
The Right to Die
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health,92 the recent "right
to die" case, both of these Justices concurred separately in the holding
of Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Justice O'Connor began her opinion by referring to other cases where
"the Court has often deemed state incursions in to the body repugnant
to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause." 93 She expressed the
individual interest in the balancing equation by concluding that:
Requiring a competent adult to endure such procedures against
her will burdens the patient's liberty, dignity, and freedom to
determine the course of her own treatment. 94
90. See the flag desecration cases: United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990);
Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
91. Lewis, Arguments on Flag Burning Heard, The New York Times (May 15, 1990),
at A16, Col. 4.
92. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
93. Id. at 2856.
94. Id. at 2857.
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However, she joined with the majority in deciding that the patient had
not convincingly expressed that will, so her liberty interest was not bur-
dened, and the state's interest in its practice did not violate the Constitution.
She concluded in a pragmatic fashion95 by proposing how to resolve these
conflicting interests,9 and stated that the Court still has not decided these
other concerns.
Conversely, the first thing Justice Scalia enunciated in his opinion was
that this issue is "agonizing. "97 He wrote that it is troubling to see the
Court enlist itself into such a conflict at all when American law has always
accorded the State the power to prevent suicide." He maintained that there
is no protected liberty interest "in suicide." In his analysis, he continued
by stating that "[tihe text of the Due Process Clause does not protect
individuals against deprivations of liberty simpliciter." He then narrated,
through use of history, that the petitioner cannot show "the State has
deprived him of a right historically and traditionally protected from State
interference."" This is an excellent example of Justice Scalia striving to
separate law from morality. After restating the petitioner's reasons for
believing her case was distinguishable from suicide, he concluded that
suicide historically was not a legitimate means to cure those whose existence
became too burdensome for life.100
Abortion
Since the Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv-
ices, 10' there has been a flood of intellectual controversy concerning the
shifting of the Supreme Court's position on abortion adopted in Roe v.
Wade.102 The two major abortion cases before the Supreme Court last
term were Hodgson v. Minnesota'03 and Ohio v. Akron Center For Re-
productive Health.'04 Both of these cases revisited the area of informed
consent laws on abortion 1 and, in both of these cases, a majority of the
Court upheld state restrictions on a minor's obtaining an abortion because
of the option of judicial bypass.
In Hodgson, Justice O'Connor concurred and cast the deciding vote,
basing her decision on the acceptability of judicial bypass. She prefaced
her analysis by stating that:
95. Throughout her concurrence she cites current medical publications which factor into
her sociological viewpoint.
96. Id. at 2857-58.
97. Id. at 2859.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2860.
100. Id.
101. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
102. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
103. 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
104. 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990).
105. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
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It has been my understanding in this area that [i]f the particular
regulation does not "unduly burden" the fundamental right, ...
then our evaluation of that regulation is limited to our determi-
nation that the regulation rationally relates to a legitimate stateinterest.l°6
After-deciding that the dual parental notice requirement did unduly burden
the minor's right, Justice O'Connor found that the judicial bypass has
been recognized by the Court as sufficient to cure this otherwise uncon-
stitutional burden. Thus, her analysis of abortion legislation has not changed
since Webster and has remained consistent since her opening remarks on
this topic in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health.1 7
Since Webster, Justice Scalia has isolated himself from the rest of the
Court on the abortion issue. This writer believes emphatically that his
opinions about abortion are unrelated to his religious faith.Iu His writings
on abortion have evidenced solid positivism while he sits on a Court
dominated by conservative and liberal pragmatists.
In Webster, Scalia concurred in the judgment but would have reversed
Roe in the process. This term, in Ohio, he again concurred in the Court's
restriction validation on implied consent but added that:
[T]he Constitution contains no right to abortion. It is not to be
found in the longstanding traditions of our society, nor can it be
logically deduced from the text of the Constitution-not, that is,
without volunteering a judicial answer to the nonjusticiable ques-
tion of when human life begins.1 9
He then jabbed at the rest of the Court by stating that "[1]eaving this
matter to the political process is not only legally correct, it is pragmatically
SO.'110
The quest for legal certainty has led Justice Scalia to disavow the
Court's participation in this field as he perceives there to be no direction
from the sovereign or any otherwise legitimate precedent on the right to
abortion.
In Hodgson, more of the same was launched from his pen. He wrote
succinctly that:
The random and unpredictable results of our consequently un-
106. 110 S. Ct. at 2949-50.
107. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 103 S.Ct. 2481
(1983). See also Note, supra note 39.
108. See Kannar, supra note 9, at 1312.
109. 110 S. Ct. at 2984.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
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channeled individual views make it increasingly evident, Term after
Term, that the tools for this job are not to be found in the
lawyer's-and hence not the judge's-workbox. I continue to dis-
sent from this enterprise of devising an Abortion Code, and from
the illusion that we have the authority to do so."'
His emphasis on the need for predictability is an attack on the rest
of the Court's pragmatic weighing of each statute that may impinge on
a woman's "right" to an abortion. Further, his revulsion to the Court
not finding the law but devising its own law is based on his positivistic
belief that the legislature is the primary lawgiver.
These opinions in this area of law are written in the same tone and
style as set forth by Justice Black in his dissent in Griswold. There, in
his withering dissent, he blasted the majority by foreshadowing the fol-
lowing:
The adoption of such a loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard for
holding laws unconstitutional, if ever it is finally achieved, will
amount to a great unconstitutional shift of power to the courts
which I believe and am constrained to say will be bad for the
courts and worse for the country.11 2
Some would argue that from this decision, the majority in the Supreme
Court fixed a "mantle of arrogance" upon itself in the right to privacy
arena." 3 Justice Scalia has attempted to throw off this mantle, which he
considers an albatross about the neck of the Court.' 4 Thus, the recent
conflict between Scalia and O'Connor on abortion is not a localized limited
battle, but a revival of the struggle that Griswold launched between pos-
itivists and pragmatists on the right to privacy.
As the sole positivist on a Court dominated by pragmatists, Justice
Scalia appears, at times, to be radical in his thinking. "5 However, on
abortion, he advocates what he believes to be the just course for both
sides of this "clash of absolutes, ' " 6 removing the issue from the province
of the federal courts where both conservative and liberal pragmatists are
playing croquet with every questionable state restriction.
111. 110 S. Ct. at 2961.
112. 381 U.S. at 521, 85 S. Ct. at 1701-02.
113. See W. Eaton, supra note 40, at 39. See also, e.g., Ely, On Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale
L.J. 920, 933 (1973) ("What they [the Court] fail to do is even begin to resolve that dilemma
so far as our governmental system is concerned by associating either side of the balance [of
the unborn fetus and the woman] with a value inferable from the Constitution.").
114. See Norton, Anthology of English Literature 295 ( vol.2 3d ed. 1962) (Samuel
Coleridge's The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, verses 141-42.).
115. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
116. L. Tribe, supra note 67.
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The current Court's "game of croquet" has state legislators pondering
how to hit their ball through the hoops of precedents in order to finish
at the peg of constitutionality. Justice Scalia avers that the Court should
take its mallets and go home because cavorting in this game does not end
in legal certainty. It only results in "unchanneled individual views""' 7 which
cause greater unpredictability in determining rights under the due process
clause of the Constitution.
Diversity Jurisdiction
In Carden v. Arkoma Associates,"' Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, held that a limited partnership is not a citizen for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction and that a federal court must look to the citizenship
of the limited and general partners to determine whether there is complete
diversity." 9 The respondent limited partnership was attempting to invoke
federal diversity jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had found
complete diversity, reasoning that the limited partnership's citizenship should
be determined by reference to the citizenship of the general partners and
not the limited partners. Justice Scalia based his holding on Court pre-
cedents stemming from Chapman v. Barney.'10 That case held that "a
joint stock company organized under a law of the State of New York
... is a citizen of that State ... [b]ut cannot be a citizen of New York
[for diversity purposes] unless it be a corporation.' ' 2 He explained further
that this doctrine was "unbreached" through precedents'2 except for the
granting of jurisdiction to an entity known as a sociedad en comandita.'m
The counterargument advocated by the respondent and taken up by
Justice O'Connor was that the Court should only look to the "real parties
to the controversy" to determine diversity. This contention was analogized
from the Court's decision in Navarro Savings Assn. v. Lee,1'2 where it
held that only the citizenship of trustees and not beneficiaries of a trust
is to be determined for diversity jurisdiction. Thus, only the citizenship
of the general partners, those who actively manage the partnership, should
be inquired into for diversity.
Justice Scalia, again drawing on positivism, dismissed this proposal
by distinguishing "the rule, 'more than 150 years' old, which permits
117. 110 S. Ct. 2961.
118. 110 S. Ct. 1015 (1990). This case is an example of Justice Scalia's positivism in
statutory interpretation. /
119. 110 S. Ct. at 1021, 1022.
120. 129 U.S. 677, 9 S. Ct. 426 (1889).
121. Id. at 682, 9 S. Ct. at 428.
122. 110 S. Ct. 1015.
123. Id.; see Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 53 S. Ct. 447 (1933).
124. 446 U.S. 458, 100 S. Ct. 1779 (1980).
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trustees to sue in their own right without regard to the citizenship of the
trustees." 1 25 However, even he admitted that "[tihe resolutions we have
reached above can validly be characterized as technical, precedent-bound,
and unresponsive to policy considerations raised by the changing realities
of business organization.'2 6 He declared that any changes which will
augment the current rule of requiring the Court to look to less than an
entity's full membership for diversity should be addressed by Congress.
He concluded by explaining that this decision is not the failure to accom-
modate the "changing realities of commercial organization [but] honors
the more important policy of leaving that to the people's elected repre-
sentatives [in Congress]."' 127
This decision is another example of Scalia's attempting to provide the
court system with uniformity, as now it will not have to weigh, prag-
matically, when the societal interests and the public interests are so sig-
nificant in individual entities as to grant them citizenship in diversity.
Justice O'Connor's dissent stresses the value of this "real party" test,
taking into account the business realities of the case, and the similar lack
of control which limited partners have even compared to stockholders of
corporations. s However, this reasoning would unfortunately subject the
lower courts to new and artfully pleaded "citizenship" arguments for
various unincorporated entities, and would encourage ad hoc pragmatic
decisionmaking.' 2 9
Right to Confrontation
In the criminal procedure field, last term the Court decided Maryland
v. Craig,a0 and held that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment
does not guarantee a defendant an absolute right to a face-to-face con-
frontation with his accusers.' The state statute permitting the use of a
one-way closed circuit television to protect sexually abused minors in
testifying was held to further an important state interest that did not
125. 110 S. Ct. at 1019.
126. Id. at 1021.
127. Id. at 1022.
128. Id. at 1026. Some would argue this dissent represents an example of Justice O'Connor's
legal realism, but this author posits that within her pragmatism rests the principles of realism
just as Justice Scalia uses history in supporting his positions.
129. This could eventually lead-to forum shopping by party litigants within states where
different federal districts within states would establish different standards for "citizenship."
130. 110 S.Ct. 3157 (1990). See also Kannar, supra note 9, at 1329, where Professor
Kannar discusses Justice Scalia's opinion in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S. Ct. 2798
(1988), which was a precursor to Craig.
131. 110 S. Ct. at 3163.
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impinge on the confrontation clause's truth-seeking or symbolic purposes.3 2
In this case, Justice O'Connor balances the state's interest in prose-
cuting these heinous crimes, the individual victim's rights, the public interest
in assuring that the reliability of the confrontation clause is not violated,
and the individual defendant's right to confrontation. In holding that face-
to-face confrontation is not absolute, Justice O'Connor balanced the state's
interest in protecting those "who are allegedly victims of child abuse from
the trauma of testifying against the alleged perpetrator"' 33 against the
defendant's right to face his accusers.' 3' She held that:
We likewise conclude today that a State's interest in the physical
and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be suf-
ficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defen-
dant's right to face his accusers in court. 3
The state must be able to make an adequate showing of necessity
to use such procedures which deny the defendant's right of con-
frontation. She continued that "[t]he requisite finding of necessity
must be a case-specific one ... [with] the trial court also finding
that the child witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom
generally, but by the presence of the defendant.' ' 36
These factors, of necessity, are viewed by five members of the Court as
sufficient to deny a criminal defendant his Constitutionally guaranteed
rights. This is an example of "conservative pragmatism" which cuts against
vested rights when those rights are outweighed by conflicting societal
interests.
Justice Scalia, echoing the language of Justice Black in Gideon v.
Wainwright,137 stated emphatically in his opinion that: "[tihe Sixth Amend-
ment provides, with unmistakable clarity, that '[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with witnesses
against him.' The purpose of enshrining this protection in the Constitution
was to ensure that none of the policy interests from time to time pursued
by statutory law could overcome a defendant's right to face his accusers
in court."' 38
132. Id. at 3166-67.
133. Id. at 3167.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 3169.
137. 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963) (This was a sixth amendment case on the Right
to Counsel in which Justice Black stated that "[a]ny person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be a assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."
Id. at 344, 83 S. Ct. at 796. The right to counsel is so fundamental and essential to a fair
trial that a denial thereof constitutes a denial of due process.).
138. 110 S. Ct. at 3171.
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Again, as above in Carden, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the
"screening" of child witnesses in these cases "[p]erhaps ... is a procedure
today's society desires; perhaps (though I doubt it) it is even a fair
procedure; but it is assuredly not a procedure permitted by the Consti-
tution."13 9
He distinguished the majority's use of precedent as not pertaining to
the right of confrontation of witnesses appearing before the trier of fact,
but only corroborative of the use of hearsay evidence when the declarant
is unavailable. In this case, the witness was available and the unwillingness
to testify could not be a valid excuse for violation of the confrontation
clause."'40 Further, he held that any defect in the confrontation clause
"cannot be corrected by judicial pronouncement that it is archaic ....
For good or bad, the Sixth Amendment requires confrontation, and we
are not at liberty to ignore it.' 4 This statement rests on his principles
of adjudication as he illustrates the positivistic maxim that "even a bad
rule is better than no rule."' 42
He concluded by assaulting the logic of the majority which:
today has applied "interest-balancing" analysis where the text of
the Constitution simply does not permit it. We are not free to
conduct a cost-benefit analysis of clear and explicit constitutional
guarantees, and then to adjust their meaning to comport with our
findings. '41
Hence, the results which flow from the distinction between pragmatism
and positivism are dramatically visible. Now, an individual, in the direst
peril of his liberty, can be denied his or her basic rights under the
Constitution in a case-by-case adjudication which provides a litigant's legal
counsel no appreciable opportunity of outcome determination.
This decision is disturbing because the balancing of societal interests
infused into a traditionally absolute constitutional provision such as the
right to confrontation may open the door to similar analyses limiting other
traditional liberty provisions of the Constitution in criminal procedure.'"
139. Id. at 3172-75.
140. Id. at 3174.
141. Id. at 3176.
142. See Scalia, supra note 58.
143. 110 S. Ct. at 3176.
144. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987); Kannar, supra
note 9, at 1324.
In Hicks, Justice Scalia, writing for a Court divided 6-3, strictly construes the "plain view"




In FWIPBS, Inc., v. City of Dallas,145 writing for the Court, Justice
O'Connor held in part that a Dallas licensing provision regulating sexually
oriented businesses was unconstitutional because it did not contain the
procedural safeguards of Freedman v. Maryland.'4 Justice O'Connor util-
ized two of the conditions which require the licensing decision to be
completed within a reasonable time, and provide the possibility of prompt
judicial review in the event the license is denied. 47 She explained that
"[tihe core policy underlying Freedman is that the license for a first
amendment protected business must be issued within a reasonable time
because undue delay results in the unconstitutional suppression of protected
speech." 1 In her opinion, she narrowly tailored the above test factors in
accordance with the underlying principle that "a prior restraint of speech
bears a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."' 49
Justice Scalia dissented from this portion of her opinion, maintaining
that the activity to be regulated constituted obscenity and is unprotected
by the Constitution.5 0 He based this contention on the legal rules which
the Court set forth in previous obscenity cases including Miller v. California',,
and Ginzburg v. United States.12
145. 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990).
146. 380 U.S. 51, 85 S. Ct. 734 (1965).
147. 110 S. Ct. at 606. Justice O'Connor decides that only the first two parts of the
procedural test espoused in Freedman are required in determining the validity of this ordinance.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun concurring in the result felt that all three prongs
of the Freedman test should have been invoked.
This third prong would obligate the municipality to bear the burden of going to court
and to justify its decision once in court. Id. Justice O'Connor distinguished the movie
censorship of Freedman from this ordinance as here "the city reviews the general qualifications
of each license applicant, a ministerial act which is not presumptively invalid." Id. at 607.
148. Id. at 606.
149. Id. at 604.
150. Id. at 618.
151. 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973). "The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must
be: (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest ... ; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value." Id. at 24, 93 S. Ct. at 2615.
152. 383 U.S. 463, 86 S. Ct. 942 (1966). But see Justice Stevens' concurrence in FW/
PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. 617 (1990), wherein he reargued an earlier dissent
that "Ginzburg was decided before the Court extended First Amendment protection to
commercial speech and cannot withstand our decision in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976)."
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He writes, however, that the misapplication of these standards has
driven communities that wish to deter such objectionable behavior to resort
to various means which also impinge on protected communications. Con-
cluding this portion of his analysis he stated that "[i]t does not seem to
me desirable to perpetuate such a regime of prohibition by indirection. I
think the means of rendering it unnecessary is available under our pre-
cedents.""5 3
Thus, Justice Scalia recognized the positivistic notion that precedents
are a source of law which can be drawn on to determine a cognizable
rule of law. The rule he formulated in this case is "[the Court should]
recognize that a business devoted to the sale of highly explicit sexual
material can be found to be engaged in the marketing of obscenity, even
though each book or film it sells might, in isolation, be considered merely
pornographic and not obscene.' '5 4
He admitted that this mode of analysis is different from the rigid test
for obscenity that is applied to an individual book or film.'55 However,
the regulation in question is not directed at particular works, but only
the concentration of the prohibited activities "and constitutional analysis
should be adjusted accordingly."'' 5 6
He closed his dissent with a quotation from Chief Justice Warren in
the Jacobellis v. Ohio opinion. 57 The quotation explains the rationale of
the Court's obscenity exception from first amendment protection.' Chief
Justice Warren's phraseology is couched in pragmatism, but one should
not interpret Justice Scalia's borrowing of this noble idea as a defection
on his part from his positivist philosophy. Instead, it reasonably can be
stated that Scalia believes these tests on obscenity, which are justified by
a pragmatic approach, support a greater legal certainty for society than
the cumbersome and generally overbroad attempts of local communities
to vitiate obscenity.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In Penry v. Lynaugh,"9 Justice O'Connor's opinion held that, in the
absence of instructions informing the jury that it could consider and give
effect to the mitigating evidence of the defendant's mental retardation and
153. 110 S. Ct. at 619.
154: Id.
155. Id. at 625.
156. Id.
157. 378 U.S. 184, 84 S. Ct. 1676 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
158. 110 S. Ct. at 625. ". . . to reconcile the right of the Nation and of the States to
maintain a decent society, and, on the other hand, the right of individuals to express themselves
freely..."
159. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
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abused background by declining to impose the death penalty, the jury was
not provided with a vehicle for expressing its "reasoned moral response"
to that evidence in its sentencing decision. 16 The opinion also held that
the eighth amendment does not preclude the execution of a mentally
retarded person of the defendant's ability, who has been convicted of a
capital offense, simply because of the fact of mental retardation alone.161
Justice O'Connor first asserted that, under Teague v. Lane, 62 this
case does not announce a "new rule" as "the result was not dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final.' ' 63
She based this conclusion on the argument that the defendant only asks
the state to fulfill, to the assurance in Jurek v. Texas,'" that the special
issues determining imposition of the death penalty would be interpreted
"broadly enough to permit the sentencer to consider all of the relevant
mitigating evidence a defendant might present in imposing a sentence."' 65
In determining that the jury instructions were inadequate to provide
the jury with a procedural means of expressing its consideration of the
mitigating factors involved, Justice O'Connor consulted the record of the
trial. There she discovered that the prosecutor had stressed to the jury
that only the instructions given them by the judge' 66 should be considered
in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. She thus decided that
a reasonable juror could well have believed that mitigating factors could
not be considered. 67
Justice Scalia disagrees with Justice O'Connor's interpretation of Tea-
gue, and states that its holding
160. 109 S. Ct. at 2952.
161. Id. at 2958.
162. 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
163. 109 S. Ct. at 1070.
164. 428 U.S. 262, 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976). This case upheld the constitutionality of the
Texas death penalty statute against an eighth amendment challenge.
165. 109 S. Ct. at 2945.
166. Id. at 2942. These instructions or "special issues" upon which hinge the imposition
of the death penalty under the Texas Penal Code are as follows:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of
the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
Texas Criminal Procedure Code Ann. § 37.071(b) (Vernon 1990). The italicized sections in
the statue above are the words or phrases which the counsel for the defense argued were
ambiguous, and should have been specially charged to the jury with definitions on their full
meaning.
167. 109 S. Ct. at 2950.
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rested upon the historical role of habeas corpus in our system of
law, which is to provide a "deterrence," "the threat of [which]
serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate
courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a
manner consistent with established constitutional standards.'
'
His position is that this deterrent effect becomes hollow when the law is
so uncertain that a judge acting in good faith still reads the Court's
precedents unconstitutionally. 16 9 Accordingly, he believes that, under Tea-
gue, when the Court replaces uncertainty in the law with a clear rule, the
Court is creating a "new rule" because this result could not logically be
dictated by prior cases. 170 His concern is that the majority views Teague
as mandating that this not be a "new rule," thus gutting the case's legal
foundation in habeas corpus and possibly requiring limitation of the holding
only to situations of plain overruling.' 7' This is consistent with Justice
Scalia's philosophy, which has as one of its canons respect for precedent
and stare decisis, urging legal certainty.
Turning to the merits of the case, he charges that the majority "cannot
seriously believe that rationality and predictability can be achieved, and
capriciousness avoided, by 'narrow[ing] a sentencer's discretion to impose
the death sentence,' but expanding his discretion to 'decline to impose the
death sentence."" '1 72 The majority does this by forcing upon the sovereign
state's constitutional criminal procedure the added burden of assuring that
the sentencer must now fully consider all the mitigating evidence "for all
purposes, including purposes not specifically permitted by the questions.'
He concluded by criticizing the Court's pragmatic weighing of the individual
interest above that of the public interest in "protecting the jury's objective
consideration of the particularized circumstances.' 1 74 He identified the
Court's disruption of the former course of striking a balance between
complete discretion of the jury and no discretion in sentencing by declaring
that:
[i]t is an unguided, emotional "moral response" that the Court
demands be allowed-an outpouring of personal reaction to all the
168. Id. at 2964.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2964-65; See Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1070.
171. 109 S. Ct. at 2965.
172. Id. at 2968; quoting from McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304, 107 S. Ct. 1756,
1773 (1987) (emphasis in McClesky).
173. 109 S. Ct. at 2966.
174. Id. at 2968.
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circumstances of a defendant's life and personality, an unfocused
sympathy. Not only have we never before said the Constitution
requires this, but [our cases] have sought to eliminate precisely
the unpredictability it produces.' 7
Therefore, in his argument on the merits, Justice Scalia again appeals
for certainty in the area of criminal adjudication. Nowhere in the law are
the stakes so high as in criminal cases. Justice Scalia is keenly aware of
this fact and, because of the awesome responsibility of being the final
voice on what is the law, he demands razor thin precision in this field.
Summary
The cases reviewed above were chosen to juxtapose Justice Scalia's
positivism against Justice O'Connor's pragmatism. This writer believes that
an accurate depiction of Justice Scalia's methodology can be constructed
from the cases only by scrutinizing his writings in relation to those of
other members of the Court; no better representative of the pragmatism
displayed by the rest of the Court exists than Justice O'Connor. This
sampling of recent cases which contrasts the opinions of Justices Scalia
and O'Connor is thus illustrative of the positivist principles upon which
Justice Scalia bases his decision making.
Conclusion
In attempting to gain access to the Court, a lawyer must first be
mindful of the "rule of four," this being the number of Justices required
for issuing a writ of certiorari. 76 Thus, if one could garner the vote of
Justice Scalia, only three other Justices need be convinced to accept the
writ. To be successful, an argument addressed to Justice Scalia should
attempt to provide him with an opportunity to inject predictability and
legal certainty into the law. Conversely, if one pens an application for
certiorari in a manner which seeks to rely on the Court as an arbiter of
conflicting societal interests, the application will likely not be signed by
him. The message of this article is that when drafting applications or
briefs for the Court, an attorney should be mindful of the differing
philosophical positions of the Justices on the Court. It is easy to be cynical
and assume that many pragmatists are only result-oriented;'"7 however, it
can be successfully argued that most of the other pragmatists on the Court
today do not have an "agenda."
175. Id.
176. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 52, at 35; see also W. Harbaugh,
supra note 1, at 263; wherein Chief Justice Rehnquist describes the "cert pool" of clerks
among some of the Justices.
177. See, e.g., Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 Harv. L. Rev.
293 (1976).
1991]
650 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
Although beguiling to some, Justice Scalia's methodology has been
explained in this article as consistent with principles of positivist philosophy
and not centered in any way upon considerations of policy or morality.
This helps to expose to the practitioner the underlying reasons why Justice
Scalia might agree to an application for certiorari or vote in his or her
client's favor. In his endeavor to adhere to a law of rules, Justice Scalia
will invoke history to support his reasoning. Therefore, the clever attorney
preparing his arguments for the Court should always include legitimate
historical bases for supporting his interpretation of the statute or precedents
in controversy. Finally, if the precedents or statutes in question have been
interpreted adversely to your position in the case, all bases of law should
be utilized to urge that the prevailing rules create arbitrary and unpre-
dictable results which shroud the spirit of legal certainty.
Beau James Brock
